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INTRODUCTION
This comment explores the First Amendment implications of the
present regime for regulating Digital Subscriber Line ("DSL") ser-
vice. In particular, it will analyze the sometimes glaring differences in
the way the government regulates the high-speed Internet access of-
ferings of the major local telephone providers (the Bell companies),
as opposed to the competing services offered by other providers, in
particular cable companies. This comment concludes that the cur-
rent regime is illogical, impractical, and ill-equipped for dealing with
the fundamental changes wrought by the ascent of the Internet as a
powerful and ubiquitous tool for communications and commerce. It
relates these practical weaknesses to the regulatory regime's constitu-
tional weaknesses.
First, I will outline the basic contours of the telecommunications
industry and the antitrust-predicated system of regulation it has
spawned. Then, I will discuss the Supreme Court's First Amendment
jurisprudence as it relates to telecommunications carriers in general,
and specifically to the provision of broadband Internet access ser-
vices. Finally, I will analyze the current regulatory scheme for broad-
band Internet services provided by the Bell companies in terms of the
burdens it places on these companies' speech. I will evaluate this re-
gime by comparing it to the manner in which the government regu-
lates a similar service provided by the cable companies.
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I. BACKGROUND OF THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
A. The Communications Act of 1934
Before 1934, the telephone industry was a sort of "wild frontier,"
with a number of companies duking it out to win customers for their
relatively new-and extremely expensive to operate-services. The
Bell System, with a head-start granted by its founder Alexander Gra-
ham Bell's patents in telephone technology, was at the fore, winning
out in part by refusing to interconnect its network with those of com-
petitors. With the Communications Act of 1934, Congress charged
the Federal Communications Commission (hereinafter "FCC") with
protecting Americans' access to communications services.2 Tele-
A communications network is only as valuable as the breadth of its nodes. If a customer
has a choice between two competing, exclusive telephone networks, one of which can connect
her with a vast array of individuals with whom she can be expected to want to communicate,
while the other can only connect her with a limited set of individuals, she will surely choose the
former network. See, e.g., Thomas A. Piraino, Jr., A Proposed Antitrust Approach to High Technology
Competition, 44WM. & MARY L. REv. 65, 78-80 (2002):
The trend to monopoly in high technology markets is augmented by a set of circum-
stances that economists call "network externalities." This phenomenon results from the
fact that the benefits to a particular user increase in direct proportion to the number of
other users in the network. As a network expands, its users can communicate with a
greater number of fellow members. Consumers are naturally attracted to successful net-
works because of their greater utility. Network externalities thus reinforce the market
power of a dominant network. A telephone system is more valuable if it is connected to
a larger number of telephones. Stock exchanges gain their utility by bringing together
the maximum number of buyers and sellers of public securities. An ATM system is more
attractive to consumers if several different charge cards can be used at a single access
point. Consumers subscribe to a dominant Internet access provider such as AOL be-
cause they want to be able to communicate with the widest range of other users. Com-
puter operating systems, such as Microsoft's Windows program, become more valuable as
additional applications are developed to run on a particular system. In the case of credit
card systems, "the more cardholders in the system, the more attractive the system is to
merchants .... [T] he more merchants in the system, the more attractive the card is to
cardholders."
(citing, inter alia, David A. Balto, The Murky World of Network Mergers: Searching for the Opportunities
for Network Competition, 42 ANTITRUST BULL. 793, 846 (1997); see also Nat'l Bancard Corp. v. VISA
U.S.A., Inc., 596 F. Supp. 1231, 1260 (S.D. Fla. 1984), affd, 779 F.2d 592 (11th Cir. 1986)). For
a colorful, detailed description of telephony in its infancy, see Chapter One of PETER W. HUBER
ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW (2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter "FTL"].
2 The Communications Act of 1934, ch. 652, Title I, § 1, 48 Stat. 1064 (1934) (current ver-
sion at 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2003)). See also 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2003), declaring that the Act is
[f]or the purpose of regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by
wire and radio so as to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United
States, without discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex,
a rapid, efficient, nationwide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with
adequate facilities at reasonable charges ....
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phone networks, seen as an essential utility for the American public,3
but also seen as a natural monopoly,4 were strictly and comprehen-
sively regulated by the FCC.
Under this regime, the Bell System5 operated a franchised mo-
nopoly.6 From the switches at the core of the vast network to the
telephone handsets at its outer edges, and everything in between, the
Bell System was the sole proprietor: it operated the local exchange
networks virtually throughout the country;7 it passed this local ex-
change traffic onto its exclusive long-distance network for transmis-
sion across long distances; it controlled the gateways for international
telecommunications traffic; and it either owned, manufactured, or
invented (and often all three) just about every piece of equipment
used to operate and administer this massive network of networks.8
In exchange for government sanction of this exclusive franchise,
the Bell System was required, as a "common carrier, ' to provide its
See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (remarking that the Act was passed "for the purpose of the national
defense, for the purpose of promoting safety of life and property through the use of wire and
radio communication ... ").
4 A natural monopoly is an industry in which the efficient number of participants is only
one. Natural monopolies are characterized by extremely high costs to entry, making it a diffi-
cult and expensive undertaking to offer the product or service. The extremely high costs of
deploying a local telephone network (laying cable to reach every customer in a community, not
to mention inventing, building, deploying, operating, and maintaining the switching system
necessary to switch calls between customers) makes the telephone industry a prime candidate
for the mantle of natural monopoly. Moreover, the telephone industry is one that is character-
ized by network externalities: the value of a telephone network goes up as the number of peo-
ple connected to it go up. See, e.g., Piraino, supra note 1, at 78-80.
5 This is the moniker generally used to collectively refer to AT&T, Bell Laboratories, Inc.,
and the various local Bell Telephone Companies, which taken as a whole constituted the largest
telecommunications provider in the nation at the time the Communications Act was passed.
Although there were a handful of smaller integrated telephone networks, and many very small
rural telephone carriers, the Bell System was by far the largest and furthest-reaching.
6 47 U.S.C. § 214(a) (2003) (allowing new competitors into the market only if they demon-
strated that the "public convenience and necessity" warranted their entry); id. at 201 (a) (requir-
ing the Bell System to afford competitors access to the Bell network only if the FCC found it
"necessary or desirable in the public interest").
Smaller local exchange carriers, such as GTE, operated their own regional networks,
along with even smaller rural telephone companies. See FTL, supra note 1, § 1.3.2 (noting that
"Bell might not own everything, but some monopolist or other would dominate each discrete
market" of the communications industry). They were all considered common carriers and
given monopoly franchises, but none were regulated as extensively as was the Bell System.
8 See FTL, supra note 1, § 1.3.2 ("The Bell System [was] a colossal corporate empire; al-
though it had agreed not to grow by acquisition, nothing prevented it from building up busi-
nesses it already owned. It continued to enjoy almost blanket state and federal government
protection against competition within its own businesses.").
9 The concept of a "common carrier" derives from the English common law, with the
Crown franchising monopolies in certain endeavors, such as ferries or wharves, to ensure that
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telephone service "universally"' and on a nondiscriminatory basis to
any customer requesting it." State regulators set the prices at which
the Bell System offered these services and, in the interest of "univer-
sal service," these state regulators and the FCC required the tele-
phone company to charge higher prices to its urban business and
long-distance customers in order to help subsidize lower Prices for
local service and for its more remote residential customers. Under
this regime, everybody ostensibly benefited: the Bell System was pro-
they are operated in the public interest. See, e.g., Missouri ex rel. Baltimore & Ohio Tel. Co. v.
Bell Tel. Co., 23 F. 539, 541 (E.D. Mo. 1885):
[A telephonic system] is, perhaps, in a limited sense, and yet in a strict sense, a common
carrier. It must be equal in its dealings with all. It may not say to the lawyers of St. Louis,
"my license is to establish a telephonic system open to the doctors and the merchants,
but shutting out you gentlemen of the bar." The moment it establishes a telephonic sys-
tem here, it is bound to deal equally with all citizens in every department of business;
and the moment it opened its telephonic system to one telegraph company, that mo-
ment it put itself in a position where it was bound to open its system to any other tele-
graph company tendering equal pay for equal service.
See also FTL, supra note 1, § 1.3.1 ("The English common law gradually developed rules that
both contained monopolists' excesses and defended their monopolies."). Telephone compa-
nies are quintessentially common carriers, charged with "furnish[ing] ... communication ser-
vice upon reasonable request therefore," at "just and reasonable" charges. 47 U.S.C. § 201
(2003). See also Section 202(a), which states:
It shall be unlawful for any common carrier to make any unjust or unreasonable dis-
crimination ... or to make or give any undue or unreasonable preference or advan-
tage ... or to subject any particular person, class of persons, or locality to any undue or
unreasonable prejudice or disadvantage.
Id. § 202(a).
10 Or, more accurately, as universally as was feasible, given the difficulty in providing Amer-
ica's more remote rural customers with access to telephone services. See note 12, infra. This
limitation is analogous to contemporary concerns with the pace at which advanced communica-
tions services, such as high-speed Internet access services, are being made available to all con-
sumers.
1 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2003) (noting that the purpose of the Communications Act, in
part, is "to make available, so far as possible, to all the people of the United States, without dis-
crimination on the basis of race, color, religion, national origin, or sex, a rapid, efficient, na-
tionwide, and world-wide wire and radio communication service with adequate facilities at rea-
sonable charges . . .").
12 47 U.S.C. § 214(e) (2003) (declaring that universal service support would be provided to
those common carriers designated by state public utility commissions to be "eligible" or "best
able" to serve unserved, underserved, and/or rural areas). Moreover, Section 254(b) gears the
federal universal service regime toward "the preservation and advancement of universal service"
using the following principles:
Quality and rates[;] ... [a]ccess to advanced services[;] ... [a]ccess in rural and high
cost areas[;] ... equitable and nondiscriminatory contribution to the preservation and
advancement of universal service [;] ... specific, predictable, and sufficient Federal and
State mechanisms to preserve and advance universal service[;] ... [and] [a]ccess to ad-
vanced telecommunications services for schools, health care, and libraries.
Id. § 254.
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tected from competition and as many Americans as possible received
affordable, reliable access to telephone service.
Almost from the outset, entrepreneurs and lawyers began chip-
ping away at the monopolist's monolithic network.13 This began with
competitors attempting to add their own, specialized equipment onto
the user's side of the network to provide value-added services. 14 It
continued with creative attempts by would-be competitors to inter-
connect with the Bell System's local exchange network and offer its
customers long-distance services."' At every turn, Bell fought all of
these private, entrepreneurially-driven attempts to crack into its mo-
nopoly, both in the courts and before the FCC."
Largely, the Bell System was successful at warding off these attacks
or incrementally allowing bits and pieces of competition here and
there, but the Bell system's monopoly began to draw the eye of anti-
trust regulators, who began to recognize that certain portions of the
Bell System's network were not part of a unitary natural monopoly,
but were, in fact, separately viable competitive markets. Hence, in
13 Which is ironic, given that the much of Congress' rationale for passing the Communica-
tions Act was founded on its view of the entire telecommunications network as a "natural mo-
nopoly;" essentially, an industry in which the presence of only one supplier makes the most eco-
nomic sense.
14 See, e.g., Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (finally re-
versing FCC's policy allowing the Bell System to prohibit the "foreign attachment" of Customer
Premises Equipment; in this case, an attachment to the receiver of the telephone set which al-
lowed the user's conversation to be concealed from surrounding observers); FTL, supra note 1,
§ 5.2.1.1 (recognizing this case as the first instance of the government's allowing competitors to
interconnect with the Bell System's network, characterizing it as an epochal shift in the tradi-
tional view of the entire telecommunications network as a natural monopoly).
15 See MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cet. denied, 434 U.S.
1040 (1978) (rejecting AT&T tariffs and FCC regulations prohibiting MCI from interconnect-
ing with AT&T's long-distance network in order to offer "Execunet," a specialized private-line
service which functioned similar to AT&T's long-distance service); FTL, supra note 1, § 9.3.5
(discussing MCI Telecomms. Corp. and its significance against the backdrop of the emerging
trend of competition with the Bell System).
16 See, e.g., MCI v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983) (rul-
ing on a private antitrust suit in which the Bell system ultimately paid MCI $113 million for mo-
nopolizing the long-distance market); Mid-Texas Communications Sys., Inc. v. AT&T, 615 F.2d
1372 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912 (1980) (ruling on a private antitrust suit against
AT&T); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 580 F.2d 590 (D.C. Cir. 1978); MCI Telecomms. Corp.,
561 F.2d 365.
17 See, e.g., First Report and Order, Establishment of Policies and Procedures for Considera-
tion of Application to Provide Specialized Common Carrier Services in the Domestic Public
Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Service, 29 F.C.C.2d 870 (1971), affd, 31 F.C.C.2d 1106 (1971),
aff'd sub nom. Washington Util. & Transp. Comm'n. v. FCC, 513 F.2d 1142 (9th Cir. 1975), cert.
denied, 423 U.S. 836 (1975) (formulating rules and terms for permitting competition in intercity
private line connections in an FCC proceeding).
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the 1970s, the Justice Department (hereinafter "DOJ) brought an
antitrust suit against the Bell System in federal court.'
B. The Break-Up of the Bell System
After years of litigation, the government and the Bell System, un-
der the watchful eye of the federal judge before whom the antitrust
action had been brought, 9 entered into a complex, sweeping consent
decree. 0 This decree, known as the Modified Final Judgment (here-
inafter "MFJ"), broke the Bell System into component parts, along
where it was believed the fault-lines of the natural monopoly existed.'
The long-distance and equipment manufacturing divisions of the
Bell System became American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T)."
AT&T was initially treated, for regulatory purposes, as a "dominant
carrier" in the long-distance market." As such, it was subject to some
pricing regulation and tariff filing requirements to ensure that it was
18 Complaint, United States v. W. Elec. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (No. 74-1698).
This was not the first antitrust suit brought by the DOJ against the Bell System. See Complaint,
United States v. W. Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956) (No. 17-49). In
1956, the DOJ and the Bell System entered into a Consent Decree, but this offered little in the
way of a concrete, forward-looking solution to the DOJ's concerns. United States v. W. Elec.
Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) 68,246 (D.N.J. 1956); see generally FTL, supra note 1, § 4.4.2 (criti-
cizing the terms of the 1956 consent decree, calling its title ("Final Judgment") "ambitious[]");
James B. Speta, The Vertical Dimension of Cable Open Access, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 975, 998 (2000)
("While AT&T could have had the incentive to encourage new uses of its network, it had in-
stead the incentive to impede any innovations that threatened the common carrier business.");
T. Jason White, Case Note, Tearing Down a Fence that is Hog Tight, Horse High & Bull Strong: The
Supreme Court Reshapes Jurisdiction of Local Telephone Markets, 11 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 188, 189
(1999) ("Because AT&T was able to hold onto the most valuable pieces of the monopoly,
namely, the local and long-distance telephone markets, its monopoly power was unabated by
the 1956 consent decree.").
19 judge Harold T. Greene, of the United States District Court for the District of Columbia.
" United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
21 Id., 552 F. Supp. at 226 [hereinafter "MFJ"].
22 MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 226.
22 AT&T had been designated a "dominant" long-distance carrier by the FCC in 1980, and
the MFJ did not disrupt this classification. See First Report and Order, Policy and Rules Con-
cerning Rates for Competitive Common Carrier Services and Facilities Authorizations Therefor,
85 F.C.C.2d 1, 10-11 (1980); FTL, supra note 1, § 9.5 (discussing rate regulation of long-distance
carriers).
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not abusing its dominant position in the market, 4 but for the most
part AT&T was given free rein to offer whatever services it wished.
The local exchange divisions of the Bell System were broken up
into several "Bell Operating Companies" (hereinafter "Bell compa-
nies") . Since they provided what was believed to be the last remain-
ing naturally monopolistic telecommunications service, 7 the Bell
companies were subject to the full panoply of the FCC's and states'
strict, comprehensive service and pricing regulations, universal ser-
vice requirements,28 and prohibitions upon entering essentially any
other sector of the telecommunications industry, including informa-
tion services (such as what would become Internet access and content
services).' 9 Most importantly, the Bell companies were required to
24 See FTL, supra note 1, § 9.5.2 (describing the regulation to which dominant carriers were
subject). AT&T was later designated a "nondominant" carrier in the long-distance market, by
virtue of competitive inroads made by Sprint and MCI. Order, Motion of AT&T Corp. to be
Reclassified as a Non-dominant Carrier, 11 F.C.C.R. 3271, 3356 (1995).
25 MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 231 (only prohibiting AT&T from engaging in electronic publishing
for seven years). Judge Greene and the Department of Justice recognized that unlike the local
telephone network, it was economically feasible for numerous competing long-distance net-
works to be operating simultaneously.
26 Id. at 232 (listing the following Bell companies: Bell Telephone Company of Nevada, Illi-
nois Bell Telephone Company, Indiana Bell Telephone Company, Incorporated, Michigan Bell
Telephone Company, New England Telephone and Telegraph Company, NewJersey Bell Tele-
phone Company, New York Telephone Company, Northwestern Bell Telephone Company, Pa-
cific Northwest Bell Telephone Company, South Central Bell Telephone Company, Southern
Bell Telephone and Telegraph Company, Southwestern Bell Telephone Company, The Bell
Telephone Company of Pennsylvania, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company, The
Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Maryland, The Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Company of Virginia, The Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of West
Virginia, The Diamond State Telephone Company, The Mountain States Telephone and Tele-
graph Company, The Ohio Bell Telephone Company, The Pacific Telephone and Telegraph
Company, and Wisconsin Telephone Company). As a matter of corporate structure, the Bell
companies actually constituted seven Regional Bell Operating Companies: Bell Atlantic, Bell-
South, New York Telephone (also known as NYNEX at the time), Ameritech, Pacific Bell, U S
West, and SBC. Each of these Operating Companies served local telephone customers in a dis-
crete territory of the United States. See FTL, supra note 1, § 4.4.3.2.
27 See MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 223 ("This divestiture will sever the relationship between this local
monopoly and the other, competitive segments of AT&T, and it will thus ensure-certainly bet-
ter than could any other type of relief-that the practices which allegedly have lain heavy on the
telecommunications industry will not recur.").
28 47 U.S.C. § 254 (2003) (universal service requirements).
29 See, e.g., id. § 254 (universal service requirements); id. § 271 (a) (prohibition on Bell oper-
ating companies' provision of "interLATA" services); id. § 273 (prohibition on equipment
manufacturing); id. § 274 (prohibition on electronic publishing, which includes information
services); id. § 275 (prohibition on alarm monitoring services); see generally FTL, supra note 1,
ch. 2 (discussing telephone economics and price regulation of telephone companies).
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phase in the provision of nondiscriminatory access to their local ex-
30
changes for all long-distance carriers.
Over the ensuing decade or so, lawyers for the Bell companies del-
uged Judge Greene-who had become saddled with administering
the terms of the consent decree 3 1-with litigation, primarily in the
form of requests that Judge Greene waive particular prohibitions
upon a showing of proof by the Bell company that it could not un-
fairly leverage its local exchange monopoly in the new market it
sought to enter.32 Lawyers representing AT&T and whomever the
Bell companies would be competing with in the new market vigor-
33
ously fought most of these waiver requests.
C. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
New legislation in 1996,34 passed in part to deal with the changing
communications landscape wrought by the advent of new communi-
cations technologies such as the Internet, fiber-optics, and wireless
telephony," did not wholly change the 1934 view of the economics of
telephony. It did, however, attempt to reverse its currents by modify-
ing the 1934 Act and requiring the Bell companies to allow competi-
tors to access their monopolistic local markets.
In order to be permitted to offer long-distance services to their lo-
cal exchange customers, Bell companies were required to allow com-
petitors to offer local service to those customers. Part of this would
be accomplished through resale: competitors could purchase local
phone service from the Bell company at a discount and resell it to the
30 MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 232-34.
31 Id. at 231:
Jurisdiction is retained by this Court for the purpose of enabling any of the parties.., to
apply to this Court at any time for such further orders or directions as may be necessary
or appropriate for the construction or carrying out of this Modification of Final Judg-
ment, for the modification of any of the provisions hereof, for the enforcement of com-
pliance herewith, and for the punishment of any violation hereof.
" See, e.g., id. at 231 ("The restrictions imposed upon the separated [Bell compa-
nies] ... shall be removed upon a showing by the petitioning [Bell company] that there is no
substantial possibility that it could use its monopoly power to impede competition in the market
it seeks to enter.").
33 See generally FTL, supra note 1, § 9.6.1.2 (discussing post-divestiture modifications and waiv-
ers granted by judge Greene).
34 The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (1996) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
35 Id., pmbl. ("An Act to promote competition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for American telecommunications consumers and en-
courage the rapid deployment of new telecommunications technologies.").
36 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2003).
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local exchange customer.3 7 However, recognizing that facilities-based
competition was the best route towards creating a sustainable com-
petitive environment in the local exchange,38 the Act also required
the Bell companies to lease unbundled components of their local ex-
change service at cost-based rates. 9 All of this would be accomplished
throuah negotiated (and sometimes arbitrated) interconnection con-
tracts, overseen by state regulatory authorities to ensure that they
were not one-sided or competitively harmful.4'
With respect to high-speed Internet access, the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996 required the FCC to regulate access for competitors
to those components of the Bell companies' local telephone networks
that were necessary for providing high-speed, Digital Subscriber Line
("DSL") Internet access services." The FCC accomplishes this by af-firmatively requiring the Bell companies to unbundle the compo-
37 See id. §§ 251 (b)(1), 271 (c) (2) (B) (xiv) (2003).
38 This is due to the inherent disadvantage faced by any new competitor in each market: the
fact that their main competitor, the Bell company, has spent decades (in some places, over a
century) and hundreds of billions of dollars building vastly complex local telecommunications
networks, bases of faithful customers, and hugely recognizable brand names.
39See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. §§251(b)(2) (2003) (number portability, which allows customers
switching from the Bell company to a competitor to retain their original phone number); id.
§ 251(b) (3) (dialing parity, which ensures that customers of competitors don't have to dial any
extra digits to reach their calls' recipients); id. § 251(b) (4) (access to rights-of-way, such as tele-
phone poles, ducts, and conduits, for placement of competitors' equipment and lines); id.
§ 251(c) (2) (interconnection at nondiscriminatory rates with the Bell company's network); id.
§251(c)(3) (access to all "unbundled elements" of the Bell company's network); id.
§ 271(c) (2) (B) (iv) (access to "local loop transmission from the [Bell company's] central office
to the customer's premises"); id. § 271 (v) (transport of the competitor's customers' telephone
traffic between the Bell company's central offices); id. § 271(vi) (switching of these customers'
calls across the Bell company's network); id. § 271(vii) (nondiscriminatory access to 911 and
other emergency services, directory assistances services, and operator assistance services); id.
§ 271(viii) (white pages listings for the competitor's customers); id. § 271(ix) (sufficient tele-
phone numbers to assign to customers not electing for number portability).
40 These contracts set forth the terms and conditions under which competitive local ex-
change carriers would "interconnect" with the Bell companies' networks, so that they could,
inter alia, connect calls between their customers and the Bell companies' customers. See generally
id. § 251.
41 See id. § 252.
42 Id. § 271 (c) (2) (B) (iv) (2003) (requiring, inter alia, the unbundling of local loops, of
which DSL is a component, and leasing to competitors at cost-based rates). Moreover, one of
the primary goals of the 1996 Act was to "encourage the rapid deployment of new telecommu-
nications technologies," The Telecommunications Act of 1996, pmbl., Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110
Star. 56 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.); to this end, the 1996
Act charged the FCC and state regulators with "encourag[ing] the deployment on a reasonable
and timely basis of advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans," id. § 706(a), codi-
fied at 47 U.S.C. § 157 note.
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nents of their DSL service" (along with the rest of their local tele-
phone services44 ) and lease them to these competitors at government
regulated, cost-based rates.4" The statutory regime and the FCC pro-
vide an incentive for the Bell companies to unbundle by conditioning
authorization for the Bell companies to offer long-distance services
(high-margin fruit the local telephone companies had heretofore
been forbidden) upon a successful showing that the Bell companies
have unbundled, and that competitors are leasing these unbundled
elements. The rationale for this scheme is that it balances the goal of
promoting facilities-based competition46 in the local telephony mar-
ket with the goal of maintaining quality, high-speed Internet access
service.
Moreover, the FCC, state utility regulators, and the DOJ have all
extracted commitments from the Bell companies far above and be-
yond their requirements under the 1996 Act by withholding their ap-
proval of Bell companies' mergers until they concede the intensified
43 See Third Report and Order in Common Carrier Docket No. 98-147 and Fourth Report
and Order in Common Carrier Docket No. 96-98, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering
Advanced Telecommunications Capability, 14 F.C.C.R. 20,912 (1999) (defining the high-
frequency portion of local loops, over which DSL service is provided, as an unbundled network
element that must be provided to requesting carriers on a nondiscriminatory basis pursuant to
47 U.S.C. § 251(c) (3)).
44 This includes the local loop, shared and dedicated transport, and local switching. 47
U.S.C. §§ 271 (c) (2) (B) (iv)-(vi) (2003).
45 The pricing scheme is based on TELRIC, or Total Long Run Incremental Cost, which
admittedly builds in a modest profit for the local telephone company. Id. § 252(d).
46 The term "facilities-based competition" refers to the presence of competitors in a market
who own (or, in this case, lease) the equipment and network elements necessary to provide lo-
cal telephone service. See id. §§ 153(47) (defining the provision of "telephone exchange ser-
vice"), 271 (c)(1)(A) (defining the provision of such service on a "facilities," rather than strictly
resale, basis). This is distinct from competition based on the mere "resale" of local telephone
service-a competitor's simply purchasing the incumbent provider's service at a discount rate,
putting the competitor's name on it, and marketing it to customers. Id. § 251(c)(4). It is widely
believed that in a market such as that for local telephony, facilities-based competition is prefer-
able to resale. See, e.g., Application of Ameritech Michigan Pursuant to Section 271 of the
Communications Act Of 1934, as amended, to Provide In-Region, InterLATA Services in Michi-
gan, 12 F.C.C.R. 20,543, 20,550, 1 12 (1997) (footnotes omitted):
An incumbent LEC's ubiquitous network, financed over the years by the returns on in-
vestment under rate-of-return regulation, enables an incumbent LEC to serve new cus-
tomers at a much lower incremental cost than a facilities-based entrant that must install
its own network components. Additionally, the value of a telephone network increases
with the number of subscribers on the network. Congress recognized that duplicating
the incumbents' local networks on a ubiquitous scale would be enormously expensive. It
also recognized that no competitor could provide a viable, broad-based local telecom-
munications service without interconnecting with the incumbent LEC in order to com-
plete calls to subscribers served by the incumbent LECs' network.
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regulatory requirements.47 Attempts by regulators to extract similar
concessions from the cable companies have thus far been met with
judicial resistance.48
This extensive regulation of the telephone companies' broadband
access services stands in sharp contrast to all the other participants in
the broadband access industry. Congress,49 the FCC, 0 and the White
House5 1 have all trumpeted the need to keep the government's hands
off the Internet and allow markets to determine what shape the
Internet will take in the future, lest this burgeoning business and
communications tool be strangled in its infancy.
For this reason, the cable companies-whose cable modem service
is remarkably similar to the Bell companies' DSL service12  are sub-
ject to no Congressional requirement of open access to competitors,
and precious little FCC oversight at all in this regard.53 This is par-
47 See, e.g., Applications of Ameritech Corp., Transferor, and SBC Communications, Inc.,
Transferee, 14 F.C.C.R. 14,712 (1999) (an extensive list of conditions to FCC approval of the
SBC-Ameritech merger, including divestment of certain cellular telephone licenses, dominant-
carrier classification for certain international routes, various extensive and intensive service
quality and performance commitments pertaining to its provision of unbundled network ele-
ments to competitors, and roll-out of DSL and competitive local telephone service across the
country on a staggered schedule). Id. at 14,964-15,039. This set of conditions was dissented
from in part, by current FCC Chairman Michael Powell. Id. at 15,197.
48 For example, see the open access provision struck down in AT&T v. City of Portland. 216
F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). See also GTE.Net v. Cox Communications, 185 F. Supp. 2d 1141 (S.D.
Cal. 2002) (granting stay of suit brought by ISP alleging that cable company's exclusive agree-
ment with another ISP for providing cable modem service to its cable TV customers violated the
Communications Act's nondiscrimination requirement, pending FCC determination of
whether or not cable modem service is a "telecommunications service" subject to the common
carrier restrictions).
49 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 230(b):
It is the policy of the United States... to promote the continued development of the
Internet and other interactive computer services and other interactive media [and] to
preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that presently exists for the Internet
and other interactive computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regulation.50 For a detailed description of the FCC's "unregulation of the Internet" since the Internet's
inception in the 1960s, see JASON OXMAN, THE FCC AND THE UNREGULATION OF THE INTERNET,
OFFICE OF PLANS AND POLICY WORKING PAPER NO. 31, Federal Communications Commission
(July 1999), available at http://ftp.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp31.pdf (last
visited Apr. 10, 2003).
51 See, e.g., Nancy Victory, Assistant Secretary of Commerce, Creation of a Broadband Uni-
verse: A "Big Bang Theory," Keynote Address delivered at the Alliance for Public Technology
Broadband Symposium, Washington, D.C. (Feb. 8, 2002), available at http://www.ntia.doc.gov/
ntiahome/speeches/2002/apt_020802.htm (last visited Apr. 10, 2003) ("[T]he market, not
government, should drive broadband's roll-out. Government's role is to remove the regulatory
roadblocks that impede efficient capital investment. Then, whether carriers choose to deploy
networks and services and consumers choose to subscribe to them are marketplace decisions.").
52 See infra text accompanying notes 86-88.
53 See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 153(10) (2003) ("[A] person engaged in ... broadcasting [such as a
cable company] shall not ... be deemed a common carrier .... ); see also BARBARA ESBIN,
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ticularly noteworthy, because, like the Bell companies, most cable sys-
tems are historical monopolies that were entrenched for decades.
4
Although the Cable Act of 1992 officially prohibited franchising au-
thorities from granting "exclusive franchises, 55 the reality has been
that the vast majority of localities only have one cable service provider
to choose from. 6 Hence, these closely-guarded exclusive cable fran-
chises have enjoyed much greater government protection from com-
petition in recent years than the Bell companies' local phone net-
works.57
INTERNET OVER CABLE: DEFINING THE FUTURE IN TERMS OF THE PAST 87, 96-87, (Federal Com-
munications Commission, Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No. 30, Aug. 1998), avail-
able at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp
3O.pdf (last visited Apr. 16,
2003) (describing cable modem service in detail) (stating that the FCC generally espouses a
stance of "competitive and technological neutrality" towards Internet access provided over cable
systems and that only "if evidence indicated that cable high-speed data communications plat-
forms themselves occupied a 'bottleneck' or 'essential facilities' position vis A vis ISP or on-line
service provider access.., and there was some evidence of market failure warranting regulatory
intervention," would the "policy of competitive neutrality might well counsel a different re-
sult"); FTL, supra note 1, § 11.9 ("And while the Commission's Common Carrier Bureau re-
mains preoccupied with LECs, the broadcast and cable bureaus have cheerfully unleashed their
charges to offer competitive data services, subject to little regulation of any kind from Washing-
ton or state regulators.").
54 SeeFTL, supra note 1, § 13.7.1 ("It was common practice for municipalities to grant exclu-
sive franchises-thereby precluding entry by telcos and others-until Congress in the 1992 Ca-
ble Act outlawed this practice.").
55 47 U.S.C. § 541 (a) (1) (2003) ("[A] franchising authority may not grant an exclusive fran-
chise and may not unreasonably refuse to award an additional competitive franchise.").
56 See, e.g., Ninth Annual Report, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the
Market for the Delivery of Video Programming, MB Docket No. 02-145, FCC 02-338, 1 113
(F.C.C. rel. Dec. 31, 2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocspublic/attachmatch/
FCC-02-338Al.doc (last visited Apr. 10, 2003):
The market for the delivery of video programming to households continues to be highly
concentrated. For most consumers the choices are over-the-air broadcast, cable, two
DBS providers, and, in limited cases, an overbuilder or other delivery technol-
ogy .... [B]arriers to entry include: (a) predatory conduct including "predatory pric-
ing"; (b) strategic behavior by an incumbent to raise its rival's costs by limiting the avail-
ability of certain popular programming as well as equipment; and (c) local and state
level regulations, including delay in gaining access to local public rights-of-way as well
[as] delay in getting cable franchises.
(footnotes omitted); id. 9 115:
Relatively small percentages of consumers have a second wireline alternative, such as an
overbuild cable system. Of the 33,246 cable community units nationwide, 671, or ap-
proximately two percent have been certified by the Commission as having effective com-
Retition as a result of consumers having a choice of more than one wireline MVPD.
Compare Second Report and Order, Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced
Telecommunications Capabilities, 13 F.C.C.R. 24,011, 24,017-18 (1998) ("[A]ll incumbent LECs
must provide requesting telecommunications carriers with unbundled loops capable of trans-
porting high-speed digital signals, and must offer unbundled access to the equipment used in
the provision of advanced services[.]"), with Memorandum Opinion and Order, Applications
for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from Tele-
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This regime potentially leaves the Bell companies either unwilling
or unable to invest in their DSL services to make them faster, more
reliable, more widely available, and less expensive. The cable com-
panies, while given free reign to invest in and offer exciting new ser-
vices, are under no competitive pressure to do So. Much like their
television businesses, their broadband businesses are essentially mo-
nopolies. Satellite and other wireless forms of Internet access simply
have not yet caught up enough to be a major factor in this industry,"'
and the telephone companies will not become a factor until the huge
investment needed to do so becomes justified by its returns.60
The result is that broadband services are not being made available
to customers quickly enough, at high enough quality and bandwidth,
and at low enough prices. This bottleneck in the rollout of broad-
band services has ripple effects across the American economy, espe-
cially with respect to the computer and burgeoning "new media" in-
Communications, Inc. to AT&T Corp., Cable Services Docket No. 98-178, FCC 99-24 1 96
(F.C.C. Feb. 18, 1999), available at http://www.fcc.gov/pub/Bureaus/cable/orders/1999
/fcc99024 (last visited Apr. 10, 2003), which states:
Based on [the] representation [by the applicants that the ability for their customers to
"click through" their home screens to access alternative Internet service and content
providers], we conclude nothing about the proposed merger would deny any customer
(including AT&T-TCI customers) the ability to access the Internet content or portal of
his or her choice.
58 See Kenneth Katkin, Cable Open Access and Direct Access to Intelsat, 53 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 77,107 (2002) ("Because very few communities currently enjoy two or more overbuilt HFC cable
systems, very few incumbent cable operators face intramodal competition in the provision of
cable modem service.").
59 See William E. Lee, Cable Modem Service and the First Amendment: Adventures in a "Doctrinal
Wasteland," 16 HARV.J.L. & TECH. 125, 130 (2002) ("Due to technical limitations and the costs
of equipment and service, satellite-based Internet connections to date have attracted fewer than
1% of the 16 million Direct Broadcast Satellite ('DBS') subscribers."); id. at 130 n.29 (citing
Eighth Annual Report, Annual Assessment of the Status of Competition in the Market for the Delivery of
Video Programming, CS Docket No. 01-129, FCC 01-389, 62 (Jan. 14, 2002); Second Report, In-
quiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Ameri-
cans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, CC Docket No. 98-146, 15 F.C.C.R. 20,913, 1 56-59
(2000)) (supplying data on the limited practical alternatives to DSL and market-leading cable
modem service).
W It may be too late when they finally do catch up. See Katkin, supra note 58, at 110
("[C]able continues to enjoy a number of advantages over its intermodal competitors, includ-
ing both the cost savings that cable operators derive from the incumbency of their existing 'last
mile' facilities, and the technological capacity of HFC cable to offer substantially higher trans-
mission speeds than competing facilities.").
61 See, e.g., RobertJ. Samuelson, Broadband s Faded Promise, WASH. POST, Dec. 12, 2001, at A35
("[B]roadband hasn't lived up to the hype. In 1996 one well-known consulting firm predicted
that broadband would be in 14 million homes by the end of 2000; the actual figure was half
that.").
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dustries. An ancillary effect is that a vibrant new medium for free,
unregulated expression is not what it should be, certainly is not what
it could be, and it may never be.
II. THE FIRST AMENDMENT AND THE REGULATION
OF BROADBAND INTERNET ACCESS
Recently, there has been a renewed push from Congress63 for
legislation that will specifically address the heretofore limited roll-out
of broadband Internet access services and the failures of the 1996 Act
to create a proper regulatory environment for these services to flour-
ish. 64 Newly proposed legislation seeks to give the Bell companies the
tools they need to compete with the cable companies on an equal
footing in the broadband market by removing the requirement that
they unbundle these facilities and lease them to competitors.5 This is
62 See, e.g., Jonathan Krim, Does Fast Internet Need a Push?, WASH. POST, Jan. 15, 2002, at Al
("Often competitors in the marketplace, tech companies are united in their view that broad-
band could be a catalyst not just for recovery of their own battered sector but also for the next
economic boom."). The availability, price, and quality of broadband Internet access are not the
only factors hindering the Internet from realizing its true potential as a social, cultural, and
economic force. For example, some observers point to the fact that the most desirable online
content for which broadband would be used is "in the hands of copyright holders," such as mu-
sic and video. Lawrence Lessig, Who's Holding Back Broadband?, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 2002, at
A17, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/Al1361-2
0 0 2Jan 7 (last visited
Apr. 10, 2002); see also Samuelson, supra note 61 ("The larger problem is that once you've got it,
broadband isn't much use. Downloading is quicker, but most of those fabulous multimedia
services and new Internet appliances essentially don't exist."). This complaint, however, feeds
into a "chicken-egg" tautology: broadband Internet access is not good enough (in terms of
price, availability, and quality, as well as in terms of the lack of desirable content online) be-
cause consumers are not interested in it; consumers are not interested in it because it is not
good enough. See, e.g., Samuelson, supra note 61 ("Color TV faced the same dilemma in the
1960s. The networks wouldn't produce color programs until people had color sets, and people
wouldn't buy color sets unless they could watch color programs.").
63 On February 27, 2002, the House of Representatives passed a bill which would, in part,
deregulate the Bell companies' provision of Internet access and transport services. H.R. 1542,
107th Cong. (2002). This bill, however, is likely to face significant opposition in the Senate.
See, e.g., Steven Labaton, Broadband Bill Advances, But Its Survival Is Doubtful, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28,
2002, at C4 ("Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina, the chairmman of the Commerce
Committee, summoned reporters to a news conference to denounce the legislation as 'blas-
phemy.'").
64 See, e.g., H.R. 1542 §§ 2(a) (2) ("The imposition of regulations by the Federal Communica-
tions Commission and the States has impeded the rapid delivery of high speed Internet access
services and Internet backbone services to the public, thereby reducing consumer choice and
welfare."); id. § 2(a)(6) ("Since the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, the
Federal Communications Commission has construed the prohibition on Bell operating com-
pany provision of interLATA services in a manner that has impeded the development of ad-
vanced telecommunications services, thereby limiting consumer choice and welfare.").
65 Id. § 4(a):
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a desirable result, from an economic or public policy standpoint.
More than this, however, as the following discussion will show, this is
a desirable result from a First Amendment perspective.
A. In General
As one would suspect, the First Amendment plays an important
role in limiting the government's ability to regulate telecommunica-
tions. Telephone lines transmit speech; broadband DSL and cable
modem lines transmit huge amounts of speech at very high speeds.
The First Amendment prohibits Congress from unnecessarily inter-
fering with the free delivery of speech. 6 The Supreme Court also has
found that this prohibition extends to the right not to carry speech.67
Requiring a telephone carrier to-in the form of unbundling its net-
work and leasing its components-carry the speech of its competitors
clearly interferes with that carrier's right not to carry speech. The
question then becomes whether this interference is necessary.
B. The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the First Amendment
In its First Amendment jurisprudence, the Supreme Court has
traditionally based its analysis of putatively speech-inhibiting state ac-
tion on the identity and functions of the speaker. What has evolved is
a three-tiered system of analysis of First Amendment issues. At the
top is speech carried by newspapers-the "free press." Any regula-
[N]either the Commission, nor any State, shall have authority to regulate the rates,
charges, terms, or conditions for, or entry into the provision of, any high speed data ser-
vice, Internet backbone service, or Internet access service; nor shall the Commission im-
pose or require the collection of any fees, taxes, charges, or tariffs upon such service that
is not imposed or required on the date of enactment of this section.
(amending Part I of title II of the Communications Act of 1934 by adding § 232(a) (quoted
above)). See also id. § 4(b) ("[N]either the Commission nor any State shall ... require an in-
cumbent local exchange carrier to provide unbundled access ... to any ... network element.")
(amending Section 251 of the Communications Act of 1934 by adding subsection (j) (E) quoted
herein).
U.S. CONST. amend. I; Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181
(4th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot, 516 U.S. 415 (1996) (applying intermediate scrutiny, striking
down a statutory ban on Bell company provision of video programming service as a violation of
the First Amendment); see also FTL, supra note 1, § 14.6.2.2 ("Common carriers may be required
to carry freight for others, but that does not mean they may constitutionally be barred from car-
rying expressive freight for themselves.").
67 SeeWooleyv. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977) (in holding that the State of New Hamp-
shire could not constitutionally prohibit citizens from obscuring the words "Live Free or Die"
from their license plates, stating that "the right of freedom of thought protected by the First
Amendment against state action includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain
from speaking at all").
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tions impairing such speech, including restrictions based on antitrust
concerns, are subject to strict judicial scrutiny. s Such limits are gen-
erally likely to fall in the face of the overwhelming importance we
place on these speakers' abilities to carry any sort of discourse, unfet-
tered by government interference of any sort, even interference fur-
thering important antitrust objectives. 69
In the middle are the cable companies. While they are like com-
mon carriers in that they provide the conduit through which speech
gains access to eyeballs and ears, they are considered more like
broadcasters, and hence providers of speech, because they exercise
editorial control over the content that wends its way through the
conduit.7° However, cable companies do not suffer from the same
technological constraints as airwave-based television broadcasters,
whose broadcasting "spectrum" is quite limited.71 Thus, the Court has
found content-neutral regulation of speech carried by cable compa-
nies to warrant not the "rational basis" scrutiny afforded to broadcast-
targeted regulations,72 but "intermediate scrutiny:" the statute will
68 See, e.g., Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). It is important to note that,
while the vertical restraints at issue in Associated Press survived strict scrutiny, they were relatively
mild: while the measures prohibited the Associated Press from discriminating anticompetitively
in the access it proffered to its wire service for competing publishers, it did not prevent the As-
sociated Press from gathering news service outright, operating a news wire for profit, or engag-
ing in newspaper publishing; see also FTL, supra note 1, § 14.6.2.2 ("[U]se of public facilities
[does not] suspend First Amendment rights. Newspapers place their boxes on public sidewalks;
demonstrators parade on public streets; cable operators and telephone companies run their
wires overhead along the same routes.") (footnotes omitted).
69 See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994) (opinion of Kennedy, J.)
("[T]he mere assertion of dysfunction or failure in a speech market, without more, is not suffi-
cient to shield a speech regulation from the First Amendment standards applicable to non-
broadcast media.") (citing Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 657-58
(1990)); Fed. Election Comm'n v. Mass. Citizens For Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 256-59, (1986);
Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248-58 (1974)).
70 See id., 512 U.S. at 636 ("Cable programmers and cable operators engage in and transmit
speech, and they are entitled to the protection of the speech and press provisions of the First
Amendment.") (citing Leathers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991)).
71 Id. at 636-38. See also Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 375-77 (1969) (footnotes
omitted):
Before 1927, the allocation of frequencies was left entirely to the private sector, and the
result was chaos. It quickly became apparent that broadcast frequencies constituted a
scarce resource whose use could be regulated and rationalized only by the Government.
Without government control, the medium would be of little use because of the cacoph-
ony [sic] of competing voices, none of which could be clearly and predictably heard.
Consequently, the Federal Radio Commission was established to allocate frequencies
among competing applicants in a manner responsive to the public "convenience, inter-
est, or necessity."
72 Compare Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 637 ("[T]he rationale for applying a less rigorous
standard of First Amendment scrutiny to broadcast regulation, whatever its validity in the cases
elaborating it, does not apply in the context of cable regulation.") with Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 388
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survive if "it furthers an important or substantial governmental inter-
est; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of
free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First
Amendment freedoms is no greater than is essential to the further-
ance of that interest.""
The Supreme Court has traditionally considered common carri-
ers, such as providers of telephony, to be at the bottom of its tripar-
tite taxonomy of speech protection. Because common carriers are
already required by law to carry all traffic without discrimination as to
its content, 4 and because there have historically been serious anti-
trust concerns due to the economies of the networked nature of the
service, the Court has found government action seeking indirectly
or directly to regulate telecommunications providers' carriage of
speech to be deserving of the lowest level of scrutiny-the "rational
basis" test.
However, when a common carrier provides its own speech, as with
a video programming service, regulations are subject to intermediate
scrutiny. This became evident in 1994 with Chesapeake and Potomac
Telephone Company of Virginia v. FCC, where the Fourth Circuit and the
Ninth Circuit struck down a provision of the 1992 Cable Act which
prohibited Bell companies from providing video programming ser-
76
vices.
In those cases, the government attempted to argue that rational
basis review should be employed because the prohibition was not
content-based, and it was a mere "market structure regulation, in-
tended to promote competition in the cable industry by preventing
("Where there are substantially more individuals who want to broadcast than there are frequen-
cies to allocate, it is idle to posit an unabridgeable First Amendment right to broadcast compa-
rable to the right of every individual to speak, write, or publish.").
73 United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968). See also Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v.
FCC, 512 U.S. at 640-41 (finding content-neutral must-carry provisions imposed on cable com-
panies worthy of intermediate, not strict, scrutiny from a First Amendment standpoint); Leath-
ers v. Medlock, 499 U.S. 439, 444 (1991) ("Cable television provides to its subscribers news, in-
formation, and entertainment. It is engaged in 'speech' under the First Amendment, and is, in
much of its operation, part of the 'press.'"); Quincy Cable TV, Inc. v. FCC, 768 F.2d 1434, 1444
(D.C. Cir. 1985) ("It is now clearly established.., that cable operators engage in conduct pro-
tected by the First Amendment."). See also FTL, supra note 1, § 14.6.2.2 (describing cable's posi-
tion in the traditional taxonomy).
74 See supra note 10.
75 See supra text accompanying notes 1-33.
76 Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. of Va. v. United States, 42 F.3d 181 (4th Cir. 1994), va-
cated as moot, 516 U.S. 415 (1996); U S West v. United States, 48 F.3d 1092 (9th Cir. 1994), va-
cated as moot, 516 U.S. 1115 (1996). The Supreme Court vacated these cases because the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 lifted the statutory prohibition on Bell company video
programming services, rendering the cases' holdings moot.
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the telephone companies from monopolizing the field." 7  Both the
Fourth and the Ninth Circuits rejected this argument because it was
based on the "scarcity" rationale-that intensive government regula-
tion was necessary in certain areas (such as the management of
broadcast airwaves), because without it there would be chaos. Since
there was no scarcity concern, the courts reasoned, rational-basis re-
view was inapt."'
Thus, regulation of a Bell company's transport of speech is entitled
to minimal (rational-basis) judicial scrutiny, while regulations con-
cerning the Bell company's provision of speech are subject to interme-
diatejudicial scrutiny.
Slightly complicating this framework is the Court's recognition
that "laws that single out" a speech carrier (whether a newspaper, a
cable company, or a telephone company) for "special treatment" can
be more subject to government abuse than "generally applicable"
laws. For this reason, a particular implementation of a generally ap-
plicable antitrust law may receive more lenient scrutiny than an in-
dustry- (and especially company-) specific system of regulation.7 9
C. The Impact of Technological Evolution
Over the decades since its initial foray into regulation of the tele-
communications industry, Congress and the FCC have tried hard to
77 US West, 48 F.3d at 1098. See also Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 191.
78 See Chesapeake & Potomac, 42 F.3d at 191 ("The Supreme Court has repeatedly emphasized
that the reason that regulations of broadcast media need pass only minimal scrutiny is the fact,
unique to the broadcast media, that the number of broadcast stations (television and radio)
usable productively by society is limited by physical considerations.") (citing Turner Broadcasting,
512 U.S. at 636-39; Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 397-400); US West, 48 F.3d at 1098 (citing Turner Broad-
casting, 512 U.S. at 639):
[T] he scarcity rationale does not apply to the cable television industry. In Turner, the
Supreme Court held that the "application of the more relaxed standard of scrutiny
adopted in Red Lion and the other broadcast cases is inapt when determining the First
Amendment validity of cable regulation," because "cable television does not suffer from
the inherent limitations that characterize the broadcast medium [and there is no] dan-
ger of physical interference between two cable speakers attempting to share the same
channel." Thus, for example, two competing cable concerns could each run wires to
every home in a community, giving consumers greater choices in service, without any risk
of interfering with each other's signals.
(citation omitted).
79 SeeAssociated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1945) (detailing the limited nature
of restrictions at issue and the fact that they were effected pursuant to the Sherman Antitrust
Act); see also Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 640 (explaining Associated Press's lesser scrutiny was
due to its "enforcement of a generally applicable law," and finding such restraints not as consti-
tutionally suspect as "laws that single out the press, or certain elements thereof, for special
treatment;" applying this framework to the telecommunications regime); FTL, supra note 1,
§ 14.6.2.2 (analyzing Associated Press through the Turner Broadcasting lens).
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strike a balance between the public-interest goals of the regulation of
telecommunications and its impingement into these providers' free
speech rights. However, there is a fundamental tension between the
way the government regulates communications and the empirical re-
ality that is becoming more and more evident.
The government regulates carriers. Historically, this made sense;
as early as the 1930s it was clear that only a few (if that many) actors
in the telephone, broadcast, and eventually cable industries could
muster the resources to operate an economically viable network.0 Al-
though it was the services that Congress was interested in regulating,
the best way to do so was to regulate the carriers. However, as the
pace of technology rolled onwards, this one-to-one relationship
gradually eroded. Massive technological advancements"' in the past
twenty or so years-chiefly the advent of the Internet-have made it
possible for each of these carriers to provide each others' services
(naturally, in competition with one another) with minimal difficulty.
And since the Internet is such a new, global technology, for once the
FCC is relatively ill-equipped to interfere in quite the same way.2
The result has been "convergence:" in both a corporate-structure
senses3 and an operational sense, companies are seeking to offer
80 In the early days of radio, for example, after an initial surge in popularity and explosive
growth in the number of radio stations, the costs inherent in broadcasting quality programming
to large audiences resulted in vast consolidation: only the huge radio "networks" like ABC,
NBC, and CBS profited from general-audience broadcasting, because they could broadcast the
same programming to the entire country. See Ward Hanson, The Original WWW: Web Lessons
from the Early Days of Radio, J. DIRECT MKTG., Summer 1998, at 46.
Including, but certainly not limited to, the advent of the Internet, fiber-optics technology,
wireless technology, upsurges in computer processing power coupled with decreases in equip-
ment size and cost, and the ubiquity of computing in the everyday lives of consumers.
82 Indeed, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 specifically required the FCC to forbear
from regulating intensively those services, including "advanced telecommunications services,"
that the Commission, after investigation, determined would best flourish in a deregulatory envi-
ronment. SeePub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 56, 153 (1996).
83 A major trend in the telecommunications landscape over the past decade has been con-
solidation. Whereas at the breakup of the Bell System there were seven Regional Bell Operat-
ing Companies, now there are only four: Bell Atlantic merged with NYNEX, and later GTE (one
of the few non-Bell local exchange carriers), to form Verizon; Southwestern Bell merged with
Pacific Bell and later Ameritech to form SBC; and U S West and Qwest, an Internet backbone
and discount long-distance provider, merged in 2000. See Common Carrier Bureau, Federal
Communications Commission, Mergers of Common Carriers Requiring FCC Approval, at
http://www.fcc.gov/wcb/cpd/Mergers/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2003). Only BellSouth has not yet
merged.
"Merger mania" is not limited solely to the Bell companies either. Since passage of the 1996
Act, AT&T has gobbled up: TCG, a provider of competitive local telephone service to business
customers; three of the largest cable companies in the country, Comcast, TCI, and MediaOne;
and the IBM Global Network. See Sheldon Hochheiser, A Brief History: The New AT&T, at
http://www.att.com/history/history5.html (last visited Apr. 15, 2003). In that same period,
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more and more services to their customers. Anyone with either a
huge network with massive sunk investments (the Bell companies and
cable companies) or the entrepreneurial drive and financial acumen
to cobble together through mergers, acquisitions, and resale a net-814
work of the necessary components could become a "one-stop shop:"
the fabled Holy Grail of communications. Thanks to the Internet
and its supporting technologies, a customer may now theoretically
contract with one company to meet her local, long-distance, and wire-
less telecommunications, her television viewing needs, and her Inter-
net access requirements, which can potentially be used for text mes-
saging, video telephony, and file transfer.
Gradually, the old scheme of regulating carriers as a proxy for
regulating services has become more difficult, since those services
could be provided by a wide variety of carriers. Each carrier that was
being regulated in a certain way (or not regulated at all) due to the
types of services it offered could now offer all sorts of services-
including the types of services previously offered by carriers subject to
much less regulation (or none at all).
It makes increasingly less sense for these carriers' "speech" to be
regulated differently simply because of who they are. It will be im-
portant for new regulation to concentrate more on regulating (and
choosing not to regulate) according to the type of speech, with less
regard to who is carrying that speech. Otherwise, companies offering
WorldCom, a long-distance carrier, consumed MFS, WilTel, and many other providers of local
telecommunications services to business, UUNet, a colossal Internet backbone operator, and
MCI, the second-largest long-distance carrier in the United States. See infra note 84. It even
tried to purchase Sprint, the third-largest long-distance carrier. Common Carrier Bureau, Merg-
ers of Common Cariers Requiring FCC Approval, supra. Time Warner, a cable company, merged
with AOL, an Internet service provider. Id.
84 Until recently, MCI WorldCom stood as an excellent example of this acquisition strategy.
MCI began as a long-distance carrier, but gradually began offering other services and built up
its own nationwide, fiber-optic Internet backbone. MCI Group, Milestones, at http://
www.mci.com/about-mci/milestones.jsp (last visited Apr. 10, 2003). In 1997 MCI merged with
WorldCom, a company that spent the 1980s and 1990s acquiring small, extremely modernized
companies operating fiber-optic networks and serving hugely profitable urban business markets,
as well as huge Internet backbones. WorldCom, WorldCom Data Firsts, at http://www.worldcom
.com/global/newscenter/facts/firsts (last visited Apr. 10, 2003). Even though it filed for bank-
ruptcy protection in July 2002, MCI remains the second-largest long-distance carrier in the
United States, continues to operate UUNet, one of the largest Internet backbones in the world,
and still maintains extensive local telephone operations, although it has been forced to raise its
rates recently. See Andrew Backover, MCI Boosts Bills for 3rd Time in 6 Months, USA TODAY, Dec.
4, 2002, at B3.
85 See, e.g., FrL, supra note 1, § 14.1:
Whether state or federal in origin, the law of... free speech has traditionally drawn
sharp distinctions between carriers and broadcasters. So long as those industries pro-
vided quite separate and distinct services, it was possible to regulate them differently and
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an identical service can be subject to vastly differing regulation. In
addition to varying the costs of providing these services, differentials
in regulation can give certain companies unwarranted advantages in
the marketplace over their more heavily regulated competitors.
D. What This Means for Broadband
This is currently the situation in the broadband Internet access
market. Admittedly, providing a conduit through which users may
access content is not the same thing as actually providing the content.
Hence, it would be inapt for regulations inhibiting common carriers'
broadband Internet access offerings to receive the same strict level of
scrutiny as restrictions on newspapers' publishing activities.
But high-speed Internet access service as provided by a telephone
company (via DSL) is virtually indistinguishable, from a practical
standpoint, from the access provided by a cable company (via cable
modem). Admittedly, there are some differences: DSL is offered over
telephone lines which have been modified at either end to accom-
modate digital signal transfer, whereas cable modem service is of-
fered over coaxial cables which have been modified (again, at both
ends) to provide two-way digital communications. The bandwidth
limitations are also somewhat different: in addition to the inherent
limitations in the processing capabilities of the transmission equip-
ment involved in both services and the distance the customer's prem-
ises is from the telephone company's switching facilities, DSL signal
speed is limited by artificial, price-point-based limitations placed on
the service by the telephone company, while cable modem service is
limited by the number of users in each neighborhood simultaneously
accessing the service."
These differences, however, are market-oriented differences
which will affect customers' purchasing decisions, rather than differ-
ences warranting specialized regulatory treatment. They do not
change the reality that both DSL and cable modem service provide
to treat them as quite separate creations for constitutional and other purposes. But the
industries are now converging rapidly.
8r See generally ESBIN, supra note 53, at 75-82 (describing cable modem service in detail);
KEVIN WERBACH, DIGITAL TORNADO: THE INTERNET AND TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY 69, 75
fig. 11 (Federal Communications Commission, Office of Plans and Policy, Working Paper No.
29, Mar. 1997), available at http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp29.pdf
(last visited Apr. 10, 2003) (describing DSL service and comparing the major types of internet
access).
87 See generally ESBIN, supra note 53.
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high-speed connections to the same Internet content at approxi-
mately the same flat rate."'
Because these services are so similar (in much the same way that
the Bell companies' video programming services were so similar to
cable television programming services), it does not seem appropriate
or reasonable for DSL service to be subject to the investment-
crippling unbundling requirements of Section 251 of the Communi-
cations Act and strict merger approval concessions, while cable mo-
dem service is subject to no restrictions at all.
More than simply crippling competition in the broadband Inter-
net access industry, this differential in regulation raises specific con-
cerns that the content these providers are now capable of carrying
over their networks will be interfered with by the government on an
unequal basis.89 The FCC is exercising its regulatory power in a man-
ner that is retarding the growth of one important service for carrying
speech, DSL, while allowing purveyors of the dominant service, cable
modem, to run amok.
Although common carriers have traditionally been at the bottom
rung of the First Amendment protection taxonomy,90 there is some
88 As of April 2003, residential Verizon Online DSL service sold for $29.95 per month for the
first six months and $49.95 per month thereafter. Verizon, Verizon DSL for Your Home, at
http://www.verizon.net/ (last visited Apr. 10, 2002). Residential Comcast cable modem service
sold for $42.95 for subscribers of Comcast's cable TV. Comcast, Better Value, at http://www.
comcast.com/Products/BetterValueDetails.html (last visited Apr. 11, 2003).
89 See, e.g., FTL, supra note 1, § 14.1:
Regulators have traditionally overseen what carriers do in microscopic detail, and no one
much worried about First Amendment issues because carriers rarely, if ever, raised these
matters on their own behalf. Now, high-bandwidth carriers also publish. On the new
digital media, personals, commercial ads, mail, editorials, and news all move on the same
conduits and are displayed on the same screen, combined at will, bit by bit, pixel by
pixel. The upshot is a tangle of irreconcilable rights and duties: obligations to carry, on
the one hand, and duties to censor, on the other; rights to publish freely, on the one
hand, and across-the-board accountability to regulators, on the other. The law is in a
state of enormous flux. None of the old labels and legal pigeonholes work anymore; sat-
isfactory new ones have not yet been invented.
90 See, e.g., FCC v. Midwest Video Corp., 440 U.S. 689 (1979) (striking down an FCC regula-
tion on the grounds that it regulated cable television systems as common carriers); Columbia
Broad. Sys., Inc. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm'n, 412 U.S. 94, 110 (1973):
Congress intended to permit private broadcasting to develop with the widest journalistic
freedom consistent with its public obligations. Only when the interests of the public are
found to outweigh the private journalistic interests of the broadcasters will government
power be asserted within the framework of the Act .... Congress[] flat[ly] refus[ed] to
impose a "common carrier" right of access for all persons wishing to speak out on public
issues.
See also FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 378 (1984) ("Unlike common
carriers, broadcaster and 'entitled under the First Amendment to exercise the widest journalis-
tic freedom consistent with their public [duties].'") (quoting CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367,
395 (1981) (alteration in original)); Miami Herald Publ'g Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 259
May 2003]
JOURNAL OF CONS7ITUTIONAL LA W
support on the Supreme Court for applying the same First Amend-
ment standards to common carriers as to cable companies. In her
separate opinion in Turner Broadcasting Systems, Inc. v. FCC, Justice
O'Connor, joined in part by Justices Scalia, Thomas, and Ginsburg
(!), opined that "if Congress may demand that telephone companies
operate as common carriers, it can ask the same of cable companies;
such an approach would not suffer from the defect of preferring one
speaker to another."9' Justice O'Connor made this statement in the
context of the tools Congress has at its disposal to ensure that cable
operators, especially the monopolistic ones, do not abuse their edito-
rial discretion in choosing what speech to transmit over their chan-
nels.92 But this view may be more broadly applicable: Congress
should be held to the same standard when it regulates common car-
riers' and cable companies' provision of the same service. While this
is currently the minority view, this statement could represent a more
forward-looking faction on the Court which recognizes the differ-
ences in communications today (and in the future) from communi-
cations yesterday.
E. The "Open Access" Debate
The case law to date pertaining to the "open access debate" helps
to clarify extending the concept briefly contemplated in Justice
O'Connor's Turner opinion into the realm of broadband access ser-
vices. The term "open access" refers to the effort by consumer
groups'3 and competitive, non-cable based Internet access providers
to force monopoly-franchised cable companies to unbundle their in-
frastructure and lease it to them at low rates-much as the Bell com-
panies are required to-so that these competitors may offer their own
(1974) (White,J., concurring) ("A newspaper magazine is not a public utility subject to reason-
able governmental regulation."). See also FTL, supra note 1, § 14.6.1:
Wires get more First Amendment protection in some respects because they are (appar-
ently) not scarce, but carriers-until recently, at least-have not been thought of as de-
serving much First Amendment protection at all. The Supreme Court has never ex-
pressly so ruled, but it has made noises to that effect.
See also id. at n.340.
91 Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 684 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). See also FTL, supra note 1, § 14.6.1, n.340 (listing further cases
which support this position).
92 Turner Broadcasting, 512 U.S. at 684.
93 See, e.g., AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000) (open access appeal listing
the Center for Public Interest Law, Consumer Action, Consumer Federation of America, The
Utility Reform Network, openNET Coalition, and Utility Consumers' Action Network as amici).
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cable modem service to the cable company's customers.94 Naturally,
the cable companies have refused to do this, initially on the grounds
that since they are the ones who spent the money to invest in such a
valuable network, they should not be forced to share its capabilities
and capacity with their competitors. 9'
'96
Recently, some municipal governing bodies have attempted to
force the cable companies they regulate into providing unbundled,
Bell DSL-style "open access" to competitive providers of broadband
Internet access services.97 These efforts by municipal authorities have
taken the form of straightforward ordinances requiring open access,"'
as well as conditions placed upon their permitting the transfer of ca-
ble franchise licenses when these cable providers merge with other
companies.
94 See id. at 875 ("A variety of interest groups and competitors argued that allowing AT&T to
restrict cable broadband access to the proprietary @Home service would harm competition and
reduce consumer choice.").
95 See, e.g., id. at 871 (listing Internet Service Providers U S West Interprise America, Inc. and
GTE Internetworking Inc. as intervenors and OGC Telecomm, Ltd. and Oregon Internet Ser-
vice Providers Association as amici); Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward
County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 686 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (noting that open access provision at issue
was adopted "at the prompting of GTE," a competing Internet Service Provider).
96 Pursuant to the Communications Act, much of the regulation of cable companies is left to
municipal authorities, which franchise the monopoly cable provider and permit it to access
public rights-of-way and other public facilities when it builds its network. See 47 U.S.C. § 601
(2003) (establishing minimum requirements and national policy for local municipal franchising
authorities to carry out). The logic for permitting monopolies is pretty strong: there was little
desire on the part of municipalities to allow their public rights-of-way to become a tangled mess
of competing coaxial cable infrastructure.
97 The logic here is also clear: allowing many providers to share the bottleneck facilities will
foster competition in the broadband access market, resulting in lower prices and better services
for customers.
98 See, for example, Broward County, Fl., Ordinance 1999-41, § 1.02 (July 13, 1999), which
was vacated by Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp.
2d 685, 686-87 (S.D. Fla. 2000), and stated:
Subject to technical feasibility, Franchisee shall provide any requesting Internet Service
Provider access to its Broadband Internet Access Transport Services (unbundled from
the provision of content) on rates, terms, and conditions that are at least as favorable as
those on which it provides such access to itself, to its affiliate, or to any other person.
Such access shall be provided at any technically feasible point selected by the requesting
Internet Service Provider.
99 See, e.g., AT&T v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d at 875 (invalidating condition in Portland and
Multnomah County's approval of the AT&T/TCI merger which required "non-discriminatory
access to the Franchisees' cable modem platform for providers of Internet and on-line services,
whether or not such providers are affiliated with the Transferee or the Franchisees"). As dis-
cussed above in the text accompanying notes 47-48, this has been an effective tool for exten-
sively regulating telephone companies because of the rampant consolidation that is taking place
in the cable and telecommunications industries.
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When this happened in Florida, Comcast Cablevision, the mo-
nopoly cable provider, took the municipality to federal court."° Ap-
plying strict scrutiny,'' the District Court struck down the county or-
dinance mandating open access on First Amendment grounds: the
open access requirement "unconstitutionally abridges freedom of
speech and the press,"' 2 the court found, while "the harm the ordi-
nance is purported to address appears to be non-existent.' '0 3 The ab-
sence of this harm, the Court found, is due to the fact that in the
broadband Internet access market, cable competes with DSL.10 4 This
court struck down the ordinance requiring the unbundling of a net-
work used to provide broadband Internet access on the grounds that
such unbundling works an impermissible violation of the network
owner's First Amendment rights. In so doing, the Court referred to
the FCC's own industry report to support the proposition that the
purported governmental interest behind the restriction, competitive
concerns, was non-existent, because of competition with DSL.' °
This is a strong argument in favor of the proposition that the
FCC's unbundling regime violates the First Amendment when ap-
plied to DSL. Just as the courts have found with cable modem ser-
vice, the governmental interest in the unbundling requirement-a
requirement the courts have held restricts free speech-is similarly
non-existent, because DSL competes with cable modem service in the
broadband market, as the FCC's own data suggests.
0 6
Admittedly, this holding applies to cable service, which the courts
have been careful to distinguish from common carrier service. How-
100 See Comcast Cablvision, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685.
101 In dictum, the court stated that the ordinance wouldn't pass constitutional muster under
intermediate scrutiny, either. Id. at 698 ("It has not been demonstrated that the Broward
County ordinance furthers a substantial governmental interest. Therefore, even applying con-
tent-neutral intermediate scrutiny, the ordinance violates the First Amendment.") (citing
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 640 (1994) ("[T]he mere assertion of a dysfunc-
tion or failure in a speech market, without more is not sufficient to shield a speech regulation
from the First Amendment. . .
102 Id. at 686.
103 Id. at 697. See also id. at 697-98 ("Cable possesses no monopoly power with respect to
Internet access. Most Americans now obtain Internet access through use of the telephone. Lo-
cal telephone companies provide dial up Internet access to over 46.5 million customers,
whereas all cable companies combined currently provide Internet services to only about two
million customers.").
104 Id. at 698 (citing Report, Inquiry Concerning the Deployment of Advanced Telecommu-
nications Capability To All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps
To Accelerate such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of
1996, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398 (1999)).
105 Id.
106 Id.
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ever, the characteristics of the service that are at issue and that the
court has determined make it worthy of intermediate, rather than ra-
tional-basis, scrutiny-requiring the cable company to parse out the
components of its service to all comers, even competitors-are the
very characteristics that make it much more akin to a common carrier
service than to a broadcasting service. Therefore, it makes sense to
treat the two services the same: Congress and the FCC must either
require unbundling and open access for both cable modem and DSL
service, or (more preferably) deregulate both to allow them to better
compete with one another.
III. THE ROLE OF THE FCC
Congress has given the FCC two discrete sets of regulatory tools:
one for telephone companies,' 8 and one for cable companies. 9  For
cable companies, the statutory regime charges the FCC with issuing
rules relating to license transfers, channel carriage, and the like.110 A
good deal of discretion is left to municipal franchising authorities,
but their regulation of cable companies is subject to broadly applica-
ble FCC rules."' Telephone companies have their own set of FCC
rules to follow."2
Certainly, the FCC is broadly permitted by Congress to forbear
from regulating any service or sector if its involvement would hamper
the public interest. Moreover, the Commission is required to moni-
107 Indeed, in rejecting the city of Portland's bid to assert control over a cable company's
provision of broadband service within its jurisdiction and forcing it to provide such service to all
comers on an open basis, the Ninth Circuit clearly placed the responsibility for regulating (or
not regulating) cable broadband services in the FCC's lap. See AT&T v. City of Portland, 216
F.3d 871 (9th Cir. 2000). However, neither the FCC nor Congress have gotten the message:
monopoly cable broadband continues to pass beneath the regulatory radar, while cable's only
viable competitor, the Bell companies, still are subject to investment-crippling unbundling
regulation.
. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 201-276 (2003).
109 See id. §§ 601-639 (2003).
110 See id. §§ 201-276.
Ill Id.
11 Id. §§ 201-276.
113 See 47 U.S.C. § 160(a) (2003):
[T]he Commission shall forbear from applying any regulation or any provision of this
Act to a telecommunications carrier or telecommunications service, or class of telecom-
munications carriers or telecommunications services, in any or some of its or their geo-
graphic markets, if the Commission determines that-(1) enforcement of such regula-
tion or provision is not necessary to ensure that the charges, practices, classifications, or
regulations by, for, or in connection with that telecommunications carrier or telecom-
munications services are just and reasonable and are not unjustly or unreasonably dis-
criminatory; (2) enforcement of such regulation or provision is not necessary for the
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tor the rollout of advanced telecommunications services, and forbear
from regulation of such services if it would serve the public interest."4
And the statutory regime imposed on the FCC by Congress clearly
shows a legislative decision to treat cable companies differently from
telephone companies.1 15 However, as the networked world becomes
more of a reality, and the lines between what type of company is ca-
pable of providing what type of service becomes blurred, this regime
makes less and less sense; however, the FCC is currently in charge of
changing this regime.
As the Internet becomes more important to our economy and in
our daily lives, the question of which of those companies that provide
our access to it are subject to strict regulations and which are not-
and thus, which companies will and will not be given the latitude to
help constrain the excesses of the market leaders-begins to look
more like a legislative issue. As this happens, the FCC's authority to
determine who is worthy of forbearance and who is not begins to
look more like an improRer delegation of legislative power to a fed-
eral agency by Congress.
I am not proffering nondelegation doctrine as a reason for over-
turning the current telecommunications regime."7 However, in con-
protection of consumers; and (3) forbearance from applying such provision or regula-
tion is consistent with the public interest.
See also FTL, supra note 1, §§ 3.15, 9.5 (discussing the FCC's historical application of this provi-
sion, primarily with respect to the rate regulation of long-distance carriers).114
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, § 706, 110 Stat. 56 (1996)
(codified at 47 U.S.C. § 157 note):
[The Commission] shall encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of
advanced telecommunications capability to all Americans ... by utilizing, in manner
consistent with the public interest.., regulatory forbearance .... The Commission
shall ... initiate a notice of inquiry concerning the availability of advanced telecommu-
nications capability to all Americans... it shall take immediate action to accelerate de-
ployment of such capability by removing barriers to infrastructure investment and by
promoting competition in the telecommunications market.
Compare id. §§ 201-276. (comprehensive, prohibitive, primarily federalized regulation of
local telephone companies), with id. § 601 (primarily leaving regulation up to municipal au-
thorities, guided by broad federal policies and only a few specific requirements).
I See Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (opinion of Scalia, J.),
which states:
[T]he Constitution vests "all legislative Powers herein granted ... in a Congress of the
United States." This text permits no delegation of those powers, and so we repeatedly
have said that when Congress confers decisionmaking authority upon agencies Congress
must "lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or body au-
thorized to [act] is directed to conform."
(emphasis and alterations in original) (internal citations ommitted) (citing U.S. CONsT. art. I,
§ 1; Loving v. United States, 517 U.S. 748, 771 (1996);J.W. Hampton,Jr., & Co. v. United States,
276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
117 The Supreme Court has not struck down a Congressional act as an unconstitutional dele-
gation of legislative power since the New Deal era. See Loving, 517 U.S. at 771 ("Though in 1935
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templating rehabilitative legislation for the regulation of broadband,
Congress and regulators would do well to take this and other poten-
tial constitutional infirmities-such as Equal Protection implica-
tions,'18 jurisdictional issues,"5 and Bill of Attainder concerns,-into
we struck down two delegations for lack of an intelligible principle, we have since upheld, with-
out exception, delegations under standards phrased in sweeping terms.") (internal citations
omitted) (citing A.L.A. Schecter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935); Panama
Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935)). See also Nat'l Broad. Co. v. United States, 319 U.S.
190, 216-17, 225-26 (1943) (upholding the Communications Act of 1934's delegation to the
FCC to regulate radio broadcasting in the "public interest, convenience, or necessity").
The current communications regulation regime classifies cable companies and telephone
companies differently, subjecting them to differing levels of government intervention and con-
trol in their provision of essentially the same services. See supra text accompanying notes 49-57.
Previously, as discussed above, this classification made sense-there were compelling govern-
mental interests being served in the form of universal service, affordable rates, and competitive
markets being protected from unfair leveraging by monopolists. See infra text accompanying
notes 3-12. However, the new reality of convergence means formerly monopolistic cable and
telephone carriers may cross over and compete with each other, if they are given the proper
incentives to do so. Id. Thus, it can be argued that unbundling regulations not only prevent
telephone companies from wanting to compete seriously with cable providers in broadband,
they deny them equal protection under the law.
The regulatory mechanism by which the government supervises the Bell companies' un-
bundling of broadband services may be constitutionally suspect. That mechanism, Section 251
of the Communications Act (as amended by the 1996 Act), requires such unbundling to be ef-
fected pursuant to rates and terms set by individual state utility regulatory bodies. 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(d) (2003). In each instance where a competitor wishes to lease access to these unbun-
dled elements, the federal Telecommunications statute requires them to negotiate and execute
an interconnection agreement with the Bell company. Id. § 252 (procedures for negotiation
and arbitration of interconnection agreements under state PUC auspices). However, in order
to take effect, the terms of these agreements must be reviewed and approved by state public util-
ity commissions. Id. Such review is cabined by the requirements of state law. Id. § 252(e) (3)
("[N]othing in this section [setting forth federal guidelines for negotiation and arbitration of
interconnection agreements] shall prohibit a State commission from establishing or enforcing
other requirements of State law in its review of an agreement, including requiring compliance
with intrastate telecommunications service quality standards or requirements.").
This scheme clearly implicates the Supremacy Clause: the Section 251 unbundling and in-
terconnection regime, as it currently exists, gives state courts authority to interpret agreements
wrought pursuant to federal statutes. However, because the local divisions of the Bell companies
have spent virtually all of the last century building favorable, symbiotic relationships with state
regulatory bodies (much as AT&T has cultivated a sympathetic relationship with the FCC), it is
doubtful that such constitutional concerns would ever come to the fore.
120 The 1996 Act's singling out of the Bell companies' provision of DSL services for stricter
regulation than the cable companies' provision of virtually the same service may arguably con-
stitute an unlawful Bill of Attainder. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3 (prohibiting the Government
from passing any legislation which amounts to punishing named individuals or easily ascertain-
able members of a group without a trial); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Interest Research
Group, 468 U.S. 841, 852 (1984) (endorsing a three-part test to evaluate Bill of Attainder con-
cerns: "(1) whether the challenged statute falls within the historical meaning of legislative pun-
ishment; (2) whether the statute, 'viewed in terms of the type and severity of burdens imposed,
reasonably can be said to further nonpunitive legislative purposes'; and (3) whether the legisla-
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consideration. As with the First Amendment problems, they indicate
that something is seriously wrong with both the substance and proce-
dure of the way the United States Government regulates Internet ac-
cess services.
CONCLUSION
First Amendment concerns should be foremost in legislators'
minds when they draft new broadband legislation. Given the conver-
gence that has taken place in recent years, it would be unconstitu-
tional for any legislation that is passed to require unbundling and
other extensive regulation for DSL providers, where none is imposed
on cable providers.
tive record 'evinces a congressional intent to punish"') (citing Nixon v. Adm'r of Gen. Servs.,
433 U.S. 425, 473, 475-76, 478 (1977)).
It is clear that the statutory regime at issue singles the Bell companies out "by name." How-
ever, Bell company attempts to overturn 47 U.S.C. § 271, which sets forth the hurdles a Bell
company must clear before gaining long-distance authorization, and 47 U.S.C. § 274, which
prohibits Bell companies from engaging in electronic publishing, as Bills of Attainder have
been unsuccessful, with Courts of Appeal finding the particular treatment at issue not to
amount to "punitive effect" upon or "an intention to punish" the Bell companies. See BellSouth
Corp. v. FCC, 162 F.3d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1998); SBC Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 154 F.3d 226
(5th Cir. 1998) (rejecting § 271 attacks); BellSouth Corp. v. FCC, 144 F.3d 58 (D.C. Cir. 1998)
(rejecting electronic publishing attack).
The scholarly consensus seems to be in agreement that the Bill of Attainder Clause is not
cause for concern with the current telecommunications regulation regime. See, e.g., Allison C.
Carrigan, Comment, The Bill Of Attainder Clause: A New Weapon To Challenge The Oil Pollution Act
Of 1990, 28 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 119, 149 (2000) (citing BellSouth, 162 F.3d at 685):
[A] line-of-business restriction keeping the appellant from entering a particular area of
the industry without first satisfying certain requirements was not a traditional punish-
ment under the test. Instead, the law's requirements were no different than the numer-
ous regulatory measures aimed at other industries, which have not been held to inflict
punishment .... The requirement imposed on [BellSouth] was part of an act that was
meant to provide a competitive telecommunications market in an area particularly sus-
ceptible to monopoly power. There was no punitive or suspicious motive in enacting the
legislation. The legislative history and background of the Act was clear in this regard.
(citations omitted). Indeed, the Supreme Court has struck down legislation on such grounds
only five times in history. See Grady Jessup, The Emperor's New Clothes: "But The Emperor Has Noth-
ing On!" G.S. 110-90.2's Invisible Protection Of Children And Vexatious Impact On Citizens, 24 N.C.
CENT. L.J. 103, 131 n.154 (2001) ("The Bill of Attainder Clause has been one of the original
guarantees of civil liberty, and has existed for over two hundred years. However, the Supreme
Court has relied upon it to strike down legislation only five times.") (citing United States v.
Brown, 381 U.S. 437 (1965); United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Pierce v. Carskadon,
83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 234 (1872); Ex parte Garland, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 333 (1866); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 277 (1866)).
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